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Abstract
An intertemporal voting model is examined where, at each date, there is
a pairwise majority vote between the existing chosen state and some other
state, chosen randomly. Intertemporal voting simpli￿es the strategic issues
and the agenda setting is as unrestricted as possible. The possibility of
cycles is examined, both in the intertemporal extension to the Condorcet
paradox and in more general examples. The set of possibilities is rich, as is
demonstrated by an exhaustive study of a three person, three state world.
Equilibrium in pure strategies may fail to exist but a weakening of the equi-
librium concept to admit probabilistic voting allows a general existence result
to be proved. The analysis leads to the development of a dominant state
which extends the notion of a Condorcet winner.
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11 Introduction
Although the main emphasis of Condorcet (1785) was on the probability of
making a ￿ correct￿choice, his name is now most associated with the well-
known paradox of majority voting. In its simplest, symmetric, form the
paradox can be explained as follows: three individuals (1,2,3) have prefer-
ences over three alternatives (x;y;z) as follows
1 : x y z
2 : z x y
3 : y z x
so that 1, for instance, most prefers outcome x, then y, and then z. A
majority prefer outcome x to y (individuals 1 and 2), y to z (individuals 2
and 3), and z to x (individuals 2 and 3). Thus the majority voting rule
gives rise to a ranking of alternatives that exhibits a cycle and there is no
majority or Condorcet winner.
This is by far the most famous example in the collective choice literature.
Principally, it is used to demonstrate the shortcomings of the majority vot-
ing rule. But it is more central that this. The preferences underlying the
example - Condorcet preferences - are not only an example of preferences
giving rise to cycles, they are also the only example (Inada (1969)). Specif-
ically, if, over three alternatives, there are two individuals with preferences
like individuals 1 and 2 in the example then, if it is never the case that there
is an individual with 3￿ s preferences, majority rule will not exhibit cycles and
there will be a majority winner amongst any set of alternatives. More gener-
ally, Condorcet preferences play a crucial role in Arrow￿ s (1963) proof of his
impossibility theorem. In the proof, the existence of Condorcet preferences
is used to show that the smallest group of individuals whose preferences are
respected when they agree about a pairwise decision and everybody else dis-
agrees with them, the so-called smallest almost decisive groups, consists of
only one individual. This is the important step in Arrow￿ s proof to show
that the only collective choice rule satisfying ￿ reasonable￿assumptions is a
dictatorship.
It is common to suggest that the Condorcet paradox also implies that, in
some circumstances, the process of decision making based upon majority rule
2will lead to a never ending series of decisions as individuals continually to vote
to upset any proposed status quo. Whilst this is an interesting proposition, it
does not follow from the Condorcet paradox example. Formally, equilibrium
is de￿ned to be a state which is a majority or Condorcet winner and, as there
is no such equilibrium in the example, there is no implication about ￿ what
will happen￿ . The main purpose of this paper is to extend the voting problem
to an intertemporal setting and admit cycles as an equilibrium phenomenon.
In particular, if there is su¢ cient discounting of the future then, with such
myopia, short-term gains will dominate any long-term losses. In this case,
cycles will be induced in the Condorcet example. But with less myopic
preferences, the structure of equilibrium is less clear. It is the purpose of
this paper to investigate this issue.
In voting situations, it is widely recognised that individuals may not vote
for outcomes that seem to give them higher reward. The problem is usually
approached as a game played between voters. For Farquharson (1969) and
most work since, there is a decision mechanism which may have several stages,
with voting at each stage, but there is a ￿xed conclusion to the procedure
and then implementation of an outcome. One interpretation of this is that
voters do not discount the future and it is the eventual outcome which is all
important.
With several stages of voting, the agenda is crucial for the outcome.
The agenda may be set exogenously (as in Farquharson), or endogenously
(Banks (1985), Austen-Smith (1987)), but it is important that the process
is ￿nite so that an outcome can be implemented. One implication of this is
that either the possibility of voting is a scarce good or it is made scarce by
monopoly provision by an agenda setter. Adopting an alternative approach
which makes the possibility of voting plentiful in supply raises the spectre of
inconclusive decision making.
If the voting process takes place in real time then there is no need to
reach a ￿xed outcome. Voters experience a path of outcomes and this, in
principle, can last forever. For very impatient voters, it is only the direct
outcome of any vote that is important; for patient voters, it will be where
the voting process leads that will be important. For an example of repeated
3voting over time, see Banks and Duggan (2002).
The model examined in this paper assumes that a pairwise majority vote
is taken every period between the status quo (the outcome implemented
in the previous period) and some other state, chosen randomly with equal
probability across all states. This process goes on forever so that even if no
change occurs after some ￿nite time, the then status quo will be subject to
pairwise scrutiny against all other states. With a low rate of impatience,
the possibility of voting is not a scarce resource - the rate of impatience can
be viewed as a measure of scarcity of voting. It will be assumed that there
is complete information and, in equilibrium each individual will be able to
infer what will happen in the future, conditional on what is chosen in the
present period and on the path of alternatives that will o⁄ered in the future.
Thus, voters will be able to infer their expected utility from staying at the
status quo or their expected utility from a speci￿c change in outcome. With
only one pairwise vote per period, there must be a majority winner each
period. Equilibrium will require that voters beliefs concerning what will
happen in the future be con￿rmed in equilibrium (voters cannot hold beliefs
incompatible with the equilibrium).
We start by laying down the model of intertemporal choice and investigat-
ing equilibrium in a simple extension of the Condorcet example which gives
rise to the paradox of voting. Speci￿cally, we look at a three person, three
state example with symmetry in states and voters. With such symmetry,
the equilibrium set must be symmetric - it is possible that choosing state y
forever may be an equilibrium (an equilibrium is not required to be symmet-
ric), but then choosing state x forever or z forever would also be equilibria.
We also examine the possibility of cycles and steady states as equilibrium
phenomena and determine the set of equilibria as a function of parameters.
This analysis is conducted in section 3.
Section 4 examines equilibrium in all three person, three state examples
where a Condorcet winner exists. It is shown that, in an intertemporal
model, the Condorcet winner is not always selected as the eventual steady
state. In particular, it is possible for equilibrium to involve cycles in this
case. More interestingly, it is shown that when there is a Condorcet winner in
4the atemporal problem it is possible that no intertemporal equilibrium exists.
Thus, it is possible that the behaviour induced by beliefs will contradict those
beliefs, so ruling out behaviour based upon correct beliefs.
Section 5 shifts the focus away from speci￿c examples towards the in-
tertemporal voting problem with general preferences. Section 6 concentrates
on a weakening of the concept of equilibrium which permits a general exis-
tence theorem to be proved. Section 7 develops a de￿nition of attractiveness
of a social state ￿a Generalized Condorcet Winner ￿with the property that
there are equilibria where there is convergence to such a state. Concluding
remarks are o⁄ered in Section 8.
2 The Basic Set-up
Time is discrete (t = 0;1;::::) and there is an in￿nite horizon. At each date,
social state xt must be chosen from some ￿nite set X. Let j X j= m + 1:
There is a ￿nite set of voters N and the preferences of voter i 2 N can be






where ￿;0 < ￿ < 1, is the discount factor.
At the start of each period there is a status quo state, x at date 0, and xt￿1
otherwise. Assume that there is the possibility through pairwise majority
voting, of changing the state. Speci￿cally, assume that, at each date t, voters
get to choose between the status quo and some other state, each other state
being o⁄ered with equal probability 1/m. The new state is implemented for
period t if a strict majority vote for a change. The new state becomes the
status quo for t+1. This process treats all states other than the status quo
symmetrically.
As all that matters from the past is the current status quo, it is reasonable
to assume that individual behaviour is markovian. A strategy for voter i is
a function si : X ￿X ! f0;1g determining voting intention - if si(x;y) = 1;
voter i votes for y when the status quo is x: Given everybody￿ s strategy,
Ui(x;fsg) is i￿ s discounted future expected utility, starting from x as the
5outcome at date 0. The set of strategies fsg will be an equilibrium if, for
all, i, x, y;
si(x;y) = 1 i⁄ Ui(x;fsg) < Ui(y;fsg) (2)
We are therefore looking at markovian (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium
strategies under a weak dominance requirement - agent i votes for y over x if
he prefers the consequences starting from y, irrespective of the fact that his
vote will ￿ count￿only when his vote is pivotal.
3 The Condorcet Example
We ￿rst investigate equilibrium in an intertemporal version of the Condorcet
example. Thus there are three states (x;y;z) and three individuals (1,2,3).
Individual i￿ s preferences are given by equation (1). The function ui is a
cardinal function which permits any a¢ ne transformation. The utility of the
worst (best) alternative can therefore be normalized to 0 (1), and it assumed
that there is no indi⁄erence. If the three individuals are exactly symmetric
then the instantaneous utility ui(x) will be given as in Table 1:
Table 1
x y z
1 : 1 m 0
2 : m 0 1
3 : 0 1 m
where 0 < m < 1. These preferences imply the Condorcet preferences of the
introduction. Incorporating these instantaneous utilities into the intertem-
poral utility function (1) allows us to see that preferences are dictated by two
parameters, the discount factor ￿ and m, a parameter which is a measure of
the preference for intertemporal variation. Abstracting from discounting, an
agent prefers variation with equal weight on all three states to the constant
median outcome if 1+m+0
3 > m or m < 1
2. This is akin to convexity of ui and
we will refer to preferences being convex or concave depending upon whether
m falls short or exceeds 1
2:
6We now investigate equilibrium strategies. The optimal behaviour of a
voter depends upon the future which is induced by the choice of a particular
state in the present. If y is chosen when x is the status quo, then a strict
majority prefers the path of states starting at y rather than x. This implies
that when y is the status quo, x will not be chosen over it. Thus the
movement between states induced through voting is a directed graph over
the set of states. This may be incomplete. Figure 1 is one such example
where, eventually, state y will be chosen and then it will become a steady
state outcome.
With three alternatives there are 33 = 27 possible directed graphs though
many will fail to be compatible with equilibrium. To determine equilibrium,
assume that there is an equilibrium where two states, y and z say, are both
steady states. Consider what happens when z is the status quo and y is
proposed as an alternative. If y is chosen, individual 1 will receive, applying
Table 1, m forever (U1(y) = m
1￿￿); if z is chosen then he will receive 0 forever
(U1(z) = 0). Thus he will vote to change to y. Individual 3 will also gain.
Thus, z cannot be a steady state: there is at most one steady state in any
equilibrium. If y is a steady state then individuals 1 and 3 will always vote
for y in a contest between y and z. If z does not beat x then the transfer
from x must be directly towards y. However, individuals 1 and 2 will not
vote for this change. Thus, the only possible voting outcomes which sustain
7y as a steady state are as in Figure 1 (we have yet to show that y must
positively beat x in a contest between the two).
To determine the conditions under which this is an equilibrium, it is
necessary to ensure that individuals have an incentive to induce these voting
outcomes. Consider the vote between x and y. If y is a steady state,
individual 2 will prefer to stay at x (moving to y gives the worse possible
future path of outcomes of utility 0 forever) and 3 will vote for y (thus giving
the best possible future path). What about 1? Suppressing the strategies
from the discounted utility functions gives,
U1(x) = 1 + ￿(1
2U1(y) + 1
2U1(z)) (3)
U1(y) = m + ￿(1
2U1(y) + 1
2U1(y)) (4)
U1(z) = 0 + ￿(1
2U1(z) + 1
2U1(y)) (5)
which then solve to give:








so that y will be weakly preferred to x if
m ￿ 1 ￿ ￿=2 (6)
If (6) is not strict then there will be no direct transfer from x to y.
It is still necessary to con￿rm that, between x and z, z will be chosen.
Individual 1 will vote against the change, irrespective of what happens in a
ballot between x and y. Individual 2 will vote for the change if and only if
y wins in a ballot between x and y. This requires the inequality in (6) to be
strict. Individual 3 always votes for the change (it is better to spend time
in state z rather than state x before transfer to (y).
We have thus shown:
Proposition 1 If m > 1 ￿ ￿=2 (preferences are su¢ ciently concave), there
is an equilibrium which involves voting transfers as in Figure 1 and state y
being reached as a steady state.
8Through symmetry, there are two other equilibria with x being reached
as a steady state and z being reached as a steady state.
If the opportunities to change the status quo are not scarce then voting
can occur often and the discount factor will be close to unity. In this case,
reaching a steady state can occur as an equilibrium whenever preferences are
strictly concave (m > 1
2):
We now investigate the possibility of an equilibrium with cycles. When
￿ ! 0; we have seen that the motivation behind the Condorcet paradox is
applicable. We are interested more in the case where ￿ is closer to unity.
Consider a voting outcome as in Figure 2.
Figure 1:
To examine when this can occur as an equilibrium, consider voting inten-
tions over fx;yg. For 2, anything is better than having state y for the next
period; for 3, state y gives the highest ￿ ow return for one period and delays
the path of (lower) returns for one period. Thus, individual 1 is pivotal and
expected discounted utility is given by
U1(x) = 1 + ￿(1
2U1(x) + 1
2U1(z)) (7)
U1(y) = m + ￿(1
2U1(y) + 1
2U1(x)) (8)
U1(z) = 0 + ￿(1
2(U1(z) + 1
2U1(y)) (9)
9These conditions can be solved to give expected discounted utilities. In-
dividual 1 is more likely to vote for x over y, the lower is m. Indi⁄erence
occurs when U1(x) = U1(y) = m
1￿￿;U(z) =
m￿=2
(1￿￿)(1￿￿=2) and this occurs when
m = 1￿￿=2: As voting intentions over fy;zg and fz;xg are symmetric, we
have
Proposition 2 If m < 1 ￿ ￿=2 (preferences are su¢ ciently convex), there
is a cyclic equilibrium which involves voting transfers as in Figure 2.
Note that, as m < 1; a cyclic equilibrium exists when there is su¢ cient
discounting.
A gap is left by Propositions 1 and 2 when m = 1 ￿ ￿=2: Both classes
of equilibria depend upon the pivotal voter wishing to vote for change. If
m = 1 ￿ ￿=2; the pivotal voter is indi⁄erent about the outcome, but other
voters must believe that a particular outcome will obtain to sustain their
behaviour in di⁄erent ballots. If a strategy can be speci￿ed for indi⁄erent
voters then there can be equilibria of the type described by Propositions 1
and 2 when m = 1 ￿ ￿=2. This is a measure zero possibility.
Propositions 1 and 2 do not exhaust all the possibilities of potential equi-
libria. Consider the voting outcome in Figure 3 which describes a perverse
cycle.
This possibility is perverse because, when there is a vote for change, a
majority of voters see their ￿ ow payo⁄ reduce. Can perverse cycles arise as
10an equilibria? Consider voting intentions over fx;yg. Individual 3 prefers y
because it hastens a path of returns which dominates the current ￿ ow return
of 0; individual 1, on the other hand, will vote for x because it sustains a ￿ ow
return of unity which dominates the future path of returns. Thus, individual
2 is pivotal (recall that with the belief by voters in a normal cycle (Figure
2), it was individual 1 who was pivotal). For 2, expected discounted utility
is given by:
U2(x) = m + ￿(1
2U2(x) + 1
2U2(y)) (10)
U2(y) = 0 + ￿(1
2U2(y) + 1
2U2(z)) (11)
U2(z) = 1 + ￿(1
2(U2(z) + 1
2U2(x)) (12)
Individual 2 is more likely to prefer y over x when m is small. When
there is indi⁄erence, we have U2(x) = U2(y) = m
1￿￿ and U2(z) = m(1 ￿
￿=2)=(1￿￿)(￿=2) and this occurs when m = ￿=2. As voting intentions over
the other two possible pairs are symmetric, we have
Proposition 3 If m < ￿=2; there is a perverse cyclic equilibrium which
involves voting transfers as in Figure 3.
We can collect together the results of these three propositions. Figure 4
divides the parameter space into three regions. In I, there are three voting
equilibria, each involving a move towards a single steady state; in II, the only
equilibrium is the intertemporal extension of the standard Condorcet cycle;
in III, there are two equilibria, the Condorcet cycle and a perverse cycle.
The possible existence of perverse cycles demonstrates that behaviour in
intertemporal voting problems can be driven predominantly by the beliefs of
what will happen in the future, rather than by short-term pay-o⁄s. As the
￿gure makes clear:
11when ￿ ! 0, behaviour is myopic and normal Condorcet cycles can be ex-
pected to obtain; when ￿ ! 1, which occurs when the time between ballots is
short, perverse cycles are as likely as normal cycles and steady state equilibria
can obtain for a range of parameter values.
To complete this section, we consider an asymmetric version of the model
where ordinal preferences are the same as in the above model but cardinal
preferences di⁄er across individuals. In particular, we take the case where
each agent may have a di⁄erent median state utility value mi. When can
a voting outcome as portrayed in Figure 1 arise? Our previous analysis
showed that this depended upon m1 > 1 ￿ ￿=2: Similarly, x (z) will be the
steady state if m2 > 1 ￿ ￿=2 (m3 > 1 ￿ ￿=2): If m1;m2;m3 < 1 ￿ ￿=2 then
there are no steady state equilibria but this is exactly the condition needed
for a normal Condorcet cycle.
This demonstrates that, apart from on the boundaries between the dif-
ferent classes of equilibria, an equilibrium always exists. This is a result in
stark contrast to the atemporal version of the model built upon Condorcet
winners as equilibria. We also note that, in this asymmetric model, perverse
cycles can arise when m1;m2;m3 < ￿=2:
Finally, we note that the asymmetric version of the model favours the
existence of steady state equilibria over cycles (steady state equilibria require
that the relevant inequality be satis￿ed by at least one agent, cycles require
the relevant inequality to be satis￿ed by all agents).
124 Non-Condorcet Examples
This section investigates equilibria when underlying preferences do not imply
a Condorcet cycle. We again concentrate on the case of three states and
three individuals as examples with more states or individuals must always
embody components of three state, three person cases within them. For
simplicity, we again rule out individual indi⁄erence between states (see the
next section).
Consider ￿rst the case where there is unanimity of view over some pair
of states x and y, say. If everybody prefers x to y then two individuals, call
them 1 and 2, either prefer z to x or x to z. In the ￿rst case, 1 and 2 share
the same preference of z over x over y and they will never vote for a move
from z, they will always vote for z in a pairwise ranking and, given this, they
will always vote for x over y. We therefore have:
Proposition 4 If two individuals have the same preferences over the triple
of alternatives then their preferences are respected in the intertemporal equi-
librium.
Next , consider, the second case where 1 and 2 prefer x to z. Now, 1 and
2 will never vote for a move from x, given this they will always vote for x in
a pairwise ballot. Voting over {y;zg will depend upon individual preference
but, whatever, state x will always be reached. Putting together both cases
gives
Proposition 5 If there is unanimity in preference over some pairwise rank-
ing then there is a unique intertemporal equilibrium which involves a steady
state.
The ￿nal case to consider arises when there is no pairwise unanimity
but there is a Condorcet winner. Without loss of generality, let x be the
Condorect winner with individuals 1 and 2 preferring x to y and 1 and 3
preferring x to z: By suitable of labelling of states, assume that 1 prefers y
to z. If there is no pairwise unanimity then 2 must prefer z to x and 3 must
13prefer y to x. Cardinal preferences must therefore be as in Table 2, where
0 < m1;m2;m3 < 1:
Table 2
x y z
1 : 1 m1 0
2 : m2 0 1
3 : m3 1 0
The ￿rst question to be addressed is to ask when outcome x will win in any
pairwise ranking. If x always wins, the voting over fy;zg will be determined
by purely short-term interests and y will be the chosen outcome. This,
equilibrium must be as in Figure 5
Individuals 1 and 3 will vote for y over z. Consider the ballot over fx;yg:
As y is chosen from fy;zg; the choice is between x forever and y forever so
individuals 1 and 2 will vote for x and y. Finally, consider the ballot over
fx;zg: Individual 1 prefers outcome x forever to any other intertemporal




U2(y) = 0 + ￿(1
2U2(x) + 1
2U2(y)) (14)
















U3(y) = 1 + ￿(1
2U3(y) + 1
2U3(x)) (18)













Thus, 3 will vote for x over z if m3 > ￿=2; if 2 and 3 have the same preferences
then individual 3 is more likely to vote for x and z. We have
Proposition 6 If there is a Condorcet winner, but no pairwise unanim-
ity, then preferences are as in Table 2 (for some labelling of individuals
and states). The Condorcet winner is the steady state equilibrium if ei-
ther m2 > 1 ￿ ￿=2 or m3 > ￿=2: If m2 < 1 ￿ ￿=2 and m3 < ￿=2 then the
Condorcet winner cannot be the steady state.
Proposition 6 shows that the Condorcet winner can fail to be the steady
state if preferences are su¢ ciently convex. Indeed, if all three individuals
have su¢ ciently convex preferences then, with large enough ￿, it is easy to
show that it is possible to support cycles as equilibrium phenomena. Simi-
larly, di⁄erent con￿gurations of preferences can lead to a steady state away
from the Condorcet winner. Thus, embedding the decision making into an
intertemporal voting problem strips the Condorcet winner of its position as
the natural outcome (but see Section 7 below).
In the last section it was shown that, with Condorcet preferences, an
equilibrium exists generically. When preferences imply the existence of a
Condorcet winner, Proposition 6 tells us that, when ￿ is su¢ ciently small,
m3 > ￿=2 will be assured and equilibrium exists (with the Condorcet winner
as steady state). However, when ￿ is close to unity, the intertemporal path
dictates individual preference. In particular, if the individuals have di⁄erent
preferences towards intertemporal variability, there may be no equilibrium
over a range of parameter values.
15Proposition 7 If preferences are as in Table 2, m1 > 1
2;m2;m3 < 1
2; then,
as ￿ ! 1, there is no intertemporal equilibrium.
The proof is given in the appendix. This non-existence result implies
that there are no beliefs that individuals can hold which are con￿rmed in
equilibrium. At any date, agents hold some belief about the future. This
allows them to determine which of some pair of states that they would prefer.
This determines the voting outcome at that date. Thus, the model as laid
down has the feature that, given beliefs about the future, an outcome is
determined at every date. Non-existence does not relate to the inability
to choose an outcome at each date; instead, it says that agents￿beliefs will
determine outcomes and the outcomes so determined cannot be compatible
with the beliefs. It is interesting to note that the generic non-existence only
arises when there is a Condorcet winner: when there is no Condorcet winner,
the structure biases towards the existence of a cycle - depending upon the
preferences for variability, cycles and/or steady states will be supported as
equilibria.
5 The General Case
This section investigates possibilities when there are many individuals and
many states. Assuming that the number of states is ￿nite, there are a ￿nite
number of pairwise-state dependent voting outcomes that can describe an
equilibrium. Generically, any individual will have a strict preference in any
pairwise ballot so that, if there are an odd number of individuals, each ballot
will be decisive: any equilibrium con￿guration will be a directed graph with
all states connected.
The implication of equilibria involving all states being connected rules out
an equilibrium con￿guration with two steady states at x and at y. When a
ballot occurs between x and y, one of them will be the winner, so ruling out
the other as a steady state. The other possibility of equilibrium requires the
existence of a subset of states Z which recur in￿nitely often with a ￿ cycle￿
taking place between the states - each state wins in a pairwise ballot with
some other state in the subset, any pairwise ballot between x and y where
16x 2 Z and y = 2 Z is won by x. States that tend to win in more ballots
against other elements of Z will recur more often in the cycle. Clearly, there
can be no equilibrium with two ￿ cycles￿de￿ned by unconnected subsets Z1
and Z2 as the loser in the ballot between z1 and z2; z1 2 Z1;z2 2 Z2, is ruled
out as a possible candidate for a cycle subset. Similarly, it is not possible to
have an equilibrium with both a steady state and a cycle.
Assume that equilibrium involves a cycle. Within the cycle, the shortest
sub-cycle must, generically, be of length three - if x, y, z are part of the
shortest sub-cycle, assume that transfer is from x to y and y to z. If x is
chosen over z then there is a 3-cycle, if z is chosen over x then the shortest
sub-cycle is one link less, excluding y, which is a contradiction. Thus the
motivation for equilibrium cycles is similar to that we have already studied,
the value to an individual of continuing to support a cycle relating, when
￿ ! 1; to the frequency of occurrence of di⁄erent outcomes within the cycle.
6 An Existence Theorem
The model as laid down ensures that, with some beliefs concerning the future,
an outcome is determined in every period. The troublesome result is that
it may be impossible for beliefs to be con￿rmed (Proposition 7). In these
situations, the analysis is mute because the de￿ned equilibrium concept does
not apply. There are a number of ways of relaxing the equilibrium concept
which permits beliefs to be con￿rmed. Firstly, if behaviour can be time
dependent, with equilibrium strategies ￿xed for t + 1 forwards, strategies
and equilibrium for date t are determined and backward induction de￿nes
equilibrium. This process is straightforward, at least when the model has
￿nite time. Secondly, it is possible that there are mixed strategies where
individuals determine the probability of voting for a particular outcome in
any pairwise ballot. Equilibrium then relates to the probability that an
outcome will emerge as the majority winner in a pairwise ranking with any
other outcome.
To formalize this, let the strategy of individual i be a function e si : X ￿
X ! [0;1] where e si(x;y) denotes the probability that i votes for y over x
17when the status quo is x and fx;yg is the pairwise ballot. The probability
that the vote is for x is assumed to be 1 ￿ e si though it would be possible
to introduce a probability of abstention by the inclusion of another strategy
function. Strategies determine stochastic intertemporal transfers between
states and it is possible to compute i￿ s discounted future expected utility,
starting from x as the outcome at date 0. As earlier, this can be expressed
as Ui(x;fe sg): To be more speci￿c, ￿x all other individuals￿strategies at
fe s￿ig: Given this, let Pi(x;y;fe s￿ig) be the probability that y is chosen in
the pairwise ranking of fx;yg when i votes for x over y and let Qi(x;y;fe s￿ig)
be the probability y is chosen when i votes for y over x. The function Ui
will satisfy (where other individuals strategies are suppressed as arguments).











[1 ￿ Pi(x;y)(1 ￿ e si(x;y)) ￿ Qi(x;y)e si(x;y)]Ui(x;fe sg)
(21)
For ￿xed behaviour of other individuals and behaviour in the future opti-
mized, i chooses e si(x;￿) to maximize (21) and, as this is linear in the strategy
vector, the objective function is quasi-concave. Thus, the optimal e si is an
interval. As (21) is also continuous in its arguments, and e si is chosen from
a closed interval, an optimal e si always exists. A standard existence theo-
rem (Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Theorem 1.1), based upon an application
of Kakutani￿ s ￿xed point theorem ensures existence - essentially, we have a
mixed strategy equilibrium where agents are indexed by an individual i and
a pair of states fx;yg.
Proposition 8 If individuals vote probabilistically, an intertemporal equilib-
rium exists.
If such a probabilistic equilibrium involves cycles then the consequences
of randomization is to slow down the speed of the cycle and to ensure that
the outcome incorporates a mixture of the elements that drive both a steady
state or a cyclic equilibrium. For instance, taking the preferences underlying
18the non-existence result given in Proposition 7, it is possible for a stochastic
cycle to exist fx   y; y   z; z   xg. For instance, if m2 = m3 then
an equilibrium exists with individual 1 being pivotal over fx;yg and voting
stochastically for x and individual 3 being pivotal over fx;zg and voting
stochastically for z. The movement from x to z is slowed, allowing 1 to
consider x to be a satisfactory move from y - he will be indi⁄erent - and the
extra delay that occurs when y is attained allows 3 to consider the move from
x to z to be satisfactory, again with indi⁄erence.
7 Generalized Condorcet Winners
In a static model, a state that is a Condorcet winner is, almost by de￿nition,
an equilibrium state. However, we have seen that this does not apply in the
intertemporal setting. In such a setting, a state may be a Condorcet winner
so that, as a steady state, it dominates any other path which is a steady state
- a particular state chosen forever. However, it may fail to be preferred by
an majority to a path of states (leading to a ￿ cycle￿ ) which can be supported
through majority voting. A strengthening of the conditions for a Condorcet
winner gives:
Generalized Condorcet Winner. Let PX be the set of all probability
distributions de￿ned over the set of states X. State x is a generalized Con-






holds for a strict majority of the population (this majority group being de-
pendent on y).
Thus, if x is a GCW then a majority prefer it to any probability mixing
of other states. We have:
Proposition 9 Let x be a GCW. There exists a probabilistic voting equilib-
rium with x as a steady state.
19This result is proved in the appendix. The result does not rule out the
existence of other equilibria where x is not a steady state: if the belief is
that x is not a steady state then a majority may not vote for x over some
other state y leading to a path of states because x itself will lead to a path
of states.
8 Concluding Remarks
The standard approach to the investigation of voting with ￿ foresight￿looks at
an atemporal voting problem and demands of the equilibrium concept, e.g.
sophisticated voting, that agents recognise their strategic role. By looking
at an intertemporal problem, one can ensure that the voting problem at
each point of time is su¢ ciently simple so that the equilibrium concept and
optimal behaviour are uncontroversial. The cost that is paid is that it is
necessary to specify an extensive form game - an agenda - which, through
its construction, will in part determine the type of outcome reached. In this
paper, an attempt has been made to ensure that the agenda is ￿ exible in
the sense that, over time, every chosen outcome will be faced by every other
outcome repeatedly. In addition, every ￿nite agenda path will recur in￿nitely
often. As long as individuals are su¢ ciently patient, they can recognise the
￿ exibility of the agenda - in particular, equilibria are not determined by a
restrictive agenda per se.
Within the intertemporal model, the nature of possible equilibria is rich,
even when the problem is simple. This paper has provided an exhaustive
analysis of the three state, three agent model. In this model with preferences
as in the Condorcet paradox, it is possible to have a equilibrium Condorcet
cycle as suggested by the paradox, a perverse cycle where a majority lose from
every change, or a steady state. When preferences give rise to a Condorcet
winner, the set of possibilities is further ￿ enriched￿to include the possibility
of no equilibrium.
Finally, it has been shown that general models must have, embedded
within them, the features of three state, three agent models. Pure strategy
equilibrium may take the form of a steady state, a cycle, or there may be
20non-existence. However, a probabilistic equilibrium will always exist. If
states are su¢ ciently attractive - they are Generalized Condorcet Winners -
then equilibria always exist with these states as steady states of the system.
21Appendix
Proof of Proposition 7
We show that with preferences as speci￿ed, there are eight possible equi-
librium con￿gurations and none of them are supportable as equilibrium (no
pairwise ranking involves a ballot outcome that is sensitive to the status quo).
Let con￿gurations be denoted so that the Figure 5 con￿guration is pre-
sented as fx   y;y   z;z ! xg: Consider the eight con￿gurations in
turn:
1. fx   y; y   z; z ! xg. As m2, m3 < 1
2 and ￿ is large, individuals 2
and 3 will vote for z over x. #
2. fx ! y; y   z; z ! xg. Individuals 1 and 2 will vote for x over y. #
3. fx   y; y ! z; z ! xg. Individuals 1 and 3 will vote for y over z. #
4. fx ! y; y   z; z   xg. Individuals 1 and 3 will vote for x over z. #
5. fx ! y; y ! z; z   xg. Individuals 1 and 3 will vote for y over z. #
6. fx   y; y ! z; z   xg. Individuals 1 and 3 will vote for y over z. #
7. fx   y; y   z; z   xg. As m1 > 1
2 and ￿ is large, individuals 1 and
3 will vote for y over x. #
8. fx ! y; y ! z; z ! xg. As m1 > 1
2 and ￿ is large, individuals 1 and
3 will vote for y over z. #
As this exhausts the con￿gurations, there is no equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 9
To prove this result, we construct an equilibrium with x as a steady state.
Fixing intra period utility functions, consider equilibrium in the model when





￿ and the state space is Xjx,
i.e. the GCW x is excluded from consideration and the number of states is
22m. By Proposition 8, an equilibrium exists in the truncated model. In this
equilibrium, let e p(y;z;￿) be the probability that, starting at y, state z will be
chosen after ￿ periods (e p(y;y;0) = 1): Individual i￿ s preference for w over y


























Individual i will de￿nitely vote for w over y if e Ui(w) > e Ui(y); he may ran-
domize his vote if e Ui(w) = e Ui(y):
Now consider the model with state space X where individuals have dis-
count factor ￿. We postulate a candidate equilibrium where, between w and
y, w;y 2 Xjx, individuals vote as in the truncated model and between w,
w 2 Xjx, and x, the GCW, a strict majority vote for x. With such voting
x is a steady state.
We must check that individuals are maximizing their utility by supporting
this candidate equilibrium. When x is o⁄ered it will be chosen and then it
will be chosen forever. Thus, starting at state w, the probability that x is
chosen after ￿ periods is given by










￿￿ is the probability that x has not yet arisen on the agenda.
If w is the initial state then the probability that z;z 2 Xjx, is chosen
after ￿ periods is given by











￿￿ and, conditional on the fact that x has not yet arisen on the agenda,
behaviour and probability of outcomes is the same as in the truncated model.











































The second term in (A7) is independent of w so that decisions in the trun-
cated model, based upon e Ui(￿), remain optimal in the untruncated model,
based upon, Ui(￿).
We now need only check that in the ballot between w and x; the GCW,






Using (A5), x will be strictly prefered to w by i if













As p(w;z;￿) ￿ 0 and
P
z2X
p(w;z;￿) = 1; we have






























and, from the de￿nition of a GCW, this will be satis￿ed for a strict majority
of the population. We have now shown that the candidate equilibrium is,
indeed, supported by optimal behaviour and the result is proved.
25References
Arrow, K. J. (1963), Social Choice and Individual Values (2nd edition).
Austen-Smith, D. (1987), ￿Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting over Endogenous
Agenda￿ , American Political Science Review, 81, pp. 1323-30.
Banks, J. (1985), ￿Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and Agenda Control￿ , So-
cial Choice and Welfare, 1, pp. 295-306.
Banks, J. and J. Duggan (2002), ￿A Multidimensional Model of Repeated
Elections￿ , unpublished.
Condorcet, M. (1785), Essai sur l￿ application de l￿ analyse ￿ la probabilitiØ
des dØcisions rendues ￿ la pluralitØ des voix. Paris.
Farquharson, R. (1969) Theory of Voting. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1991), Game Theory. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Inada, K. (1969), ￿On the Simple Majority Decision Rule￿ , Econometrica,
37, 490-506.
26